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DUE PROCESS AND PRO HAC VICE APPEARANCES BY
ATTORNEYS: DOES ANY PROTECTION REMAIN?
INTRODUCTION

One aspect of a state's power to regulate the practice of law is
the restriction on appearances by out-of-state lawyers.1 Although
most states permit attorneys licensed in other jurisdictions to ar-

gue individual cases within their courts, these "pro hac vice'2 appearances are often subject to the discretion of state trial courts.
Thus, the appearances are not treated uniformly among the
states,3 resulting in the danger of "random arbitrariness and sporadic injustice" when the discretion is unlimited.4
The recent Supreme Court decision in Leis v. Flynt,5 limiting
the right of attorneys to object to this discretion of a trial court,
will have significant impact on the disposition of pro hac vice applications. In a summary opinion, the Court refused to compel a

state court to grant a hearing to two out-of-state lawyers before
1. The United States Supreme Court has often recognized this power. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,
Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); Sperry v.
Florida, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96
(1963); Konigsberg v. State Bar of CaL, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130 (1873); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
2. "Pro hac vice" means literally "[flor this turn; for this one particular occasion."
BLACK'S LAW DICnONAIY 1091 (5th ed. 1979).
3. For a summary of pro hac vice practices throughout the United States, see A. KATZ,
ADMISSION OF NoNRuSmwr A'ronms PRO HAC VicE 9-28 (Research Contributions of the
American Bar Foundation No. 5, 1968). See also Brakel & Lo, Regulating the Multistate
Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. Rxv. 699, 703 nn.12-16 & accompanying text (1975).
4. Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd per curiain, 439 U.S. 438
(1979). See also Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn.), summarily aff'd, 429
U.S. 876 (1976), in which the court called Connecticut's pro hac vice policy "an arbitrary
'non-system rule' [which] was likely to violate a litigant's right to equal protection .... "
414 F. Supp. at 82. One commentator contends that current pro hac vice practice leaves
"the way... wide open for discriminatory application of the concept. If the pro hac vice
concept is to be retained, there should be assurances that it will be applied fairly, rationally
and consistently." Brakel, A Look at Multistate Practice Restrictions, 60 A.B.A.J. 1084,
1085 (1974).
5. 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
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denying them pro hac vice admission. Leis held that attorneys pos-

sess no inherent due process right to represent particular clients in
states where they have not been admitted to the bar. But the
Court did not determine when, if ever, a state's rules or actions
regarding pro hac vice appearances would require the imposition
of procedural due process protection.

A state's power to regulate the practice of law is not without
constitutional limitations. Substantive due process, for example,
requires a rational connection between any requirement for admis-

sion to the bar and an applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law. If a bar applicant's good character is challenged, procedural
due process guarantees him a hearing to respond to the charges.8
Most pro hac vice statutes and rules, including those discussed
in Leis,9 fall well within the range of state legislation permitted by
substantive due process.10 Legitimate state interests served by

state-imposed restrictions include:
(1) ensuring that those performing legal services within its borders are in fact
qualified to do so; (2) ensuring that those who practice within its borders are
familiar with its substantive liw, procedural system, and local customs; (3)
ensuring the effective administration of its legal system through the availability of attorneys for the call of the docket and emergent matters; (4) ensuring
the amenability of attorneys practicing within its borders to disciplinary proceedings for any unethical attorney conduct arising from such practice. 1

As long as these interests are served by a state's restrictions on

appearances by out-of-state lawyers, the restrictions will be valid
6. "[fln regulating the practice of law a State cannot ignore the rights of individuals
secured by the Constitution." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (injunction restraining group from recommending specific
lawyers to injured workers violated members' first and fourteenth amendment rights of free
speech, petition and assembly).
7. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
8. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
9. Omo Rnv. CoDE ANN. § 4705.01 (Page), OHIO Sup. CT. R. I, § 8(c), 29 Ohio St. 2d
xxiv (1972), provided the basis for denial of pro hac vice admission to the attorneys in Leis.
439 U.S. at 439 n.2.
10. A state statute is valid under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment if
it serves a legitimate state interest. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 485-88

(1955).
11. Note, Easing Multistate PracticeRestrictions-"Good Cause" Based Limited Admission, 29 RuTGps L. REv. 1182, 1186 (1976) [hereinafter cited Easing Restrictions]. See
also Comment, Leis v. Flynt: Retaining a Nonresident Attorney for Litigation, 79 COLUM.
L. Rav. 572, 584-88 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Retaining a Nonresident Attorney].
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on their face.' 2 One legitimate means of restricting such appear13
ances is to commit the matter to the discretion of the trial judge.
Given this discretion, however, even though the pro hac vice rule is
valid on its face, individual attorneys might be denied pro hac vice
admission "for reasons that bear no rational relationship to any
legitimate interests of the state in regulating the practice of law."1 '
This Note will consider attorneys' interests in pro hac vice
representation. 5 It will examine those interests in light of past due
process doctrine and the Court's implication in Leis that there
may be a point in an out-of-state attorney's representation of a
client when due process protection attaches.' 6 Finally, it will attempt to determine what real protection remains for an attorney
seeking admission pro hac vice in a state which grants its judges
broad discretion over the matter.
12. See Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961)(per curiam), in which the Court upheld
state rules requiring Kansas lawyers, who also practiced outside the state, to associate with
local counsel when practicing in Kansas: "[w]e cannot disregard the reasons given by the
Kansas Supreme Court for the Rules in question." Id. at 26.
13. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S.
1009 (1975).
14. Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80, 89 (D. Conn.)(Newman, J., dissenting),
summarily aff'd, 429 U.S. 876 (1976).
15. Although this Note will not address the client's interests in being represented by an
out-of-state attorney, those interests are by no means negligible. Indeed, they may well be
more significant than those of the attorney, since it is the client whose physical liberty is at
stake.
A criminal defendant charged with a felony has an absolute right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). It has also been held that "a
defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Id. at
53. See also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954). "[T]he right to retain counsel of one's
own choice, [however], is not absolute" and must sometimes yield to the public's "strong
interest in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice ...... United States
v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 877 (1979). It follows,
therefore, that a defendant's right to choose out-of-state counsel to represent him is not
absolute. Faced with the legitimate state objectives served by restrictions on participation
by out-of-state lawyers, the defendant's right may be legitimately curtailed. See text accompanying note 11 supra. For additional discussion of the client's rights in this context, see
Retaining a Nonresident Attorney, supra note 11, at 581-88.
If a state chooses to open its doors to out-of-state attorneys, it cannot do so in a manner
that violates due process or equal protection. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Deprivation of these rights may result from either statutory standards or a state's course of
conduct. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, summarily aft'g, 429 U.S. 876 (1976).
16. See notes 50-54 infra & accompanying text.
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I. LEIs v. FLYNT

Larry Flynt and Hustler Magazine, Inc., were indicted on February 8, 1977, for disseminating material harmful to children. 17 Herold Price Fahringer and Paul J. Cambria, Jr., partners in a Buffalo, New York, law firm, were named as counsel of record for
Flynt and Hustler in the designation of counsel forms filed with
the Ohio court. They were not members of the Ohio bar, so they
retained a local attorney to act as local counsel for the defendants.
Judge Rupert A. Doan, acting as judge for the purpose of designation of counsel, approved the forms on February 23, 1977.18 On
April 8, however, Judge William J. Morrissey, who had been assigned the case for trial, told Flynt: "Mr. Fahringer and Mr. Cambria are not attorneys of record in this case and will not be permitted to try this case."19 He offered no explanation for his decision.
The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed a mandamus action brought
by the defendants and their attorneys to require a hearing before
denial of the pro hac vice appearance.20
The defendants and their attorneys then instituted suit in the
federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio, claiming
that the lawyers' fourteenth amendment procedural due process
rights had been violated by the denial of a hearing. The district
court enjoined the prosecution of Flynt and Hustler pending a
hearing on the rights of Fahringer and Cambria to represent the
defendants. 1 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2 2 On
January 15, 1979, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, in a
per curiam opinion from which three justices dissented, summarily
17. The defendants had allegedly violated OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.31(A) (Page),
by publishing an article which photographically portrayed "in lurid detail the violent physi.
cal torture, dismemberment, destruction or death of a human being." Indictment, cited in
Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d at 874.
18. Whether this approval of the designation of counsel constituted admission pro hac
vice was an important issue in the Supreme Court's decision. See note 54 infra & accompanying text.
19. Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d at 874.
20. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, in response to an affidavit of bias and prejudice

against Judge Morrissey, reassigned the case to another judge. The court found no evidence
of bias or prejudice, but transferred the case to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. at 440. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr, CANONS, (No. 2 (1978)).
The judge to whom the case was reassigned refused to reconsider the pro hac vice applications. 439 U.S. at 440.
21. Flynt v. Leis, 434 F. Supp. 481 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
22. Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1978).
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reversed on the grounds that neither attorney enjoyed a property23

or a liberty24 right of constitutional dimension in pro hac vice

representation.2 5
The Court reasoned that no interests protected by the fourteenth amendment were implicated by the state court's denial of
pro hac vice admission, and that due process therefore did not require the lawyers to be given notice and an opportunity to be
heard.2 6
Two aspects of the Court's decision limit its scope. First, the
Court made a factual determination that the naming of Fahringer
and Cambria as counsel of record did not constitute admission pro
hac vice. Consequently Judge Morrissey's action was a denial-not
a recission-of such admission.2 7 Second, the Court did not con23. By its terms, the fourteenth amendment protects three interests-life, liberty and
property. These interests have been broadly construed for due process purposes. Discussing
property interests, the Supreme Court explained that
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard
of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific bene.. Property interests. . . are created and their dimensions are defined by
fits..
existing rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972). The understanding that creates a
property interest must be "mutually explicit" between the state and the individual who
claims entitlement; a "subjective expectancy" on the part of the individual is insufficient to
create a protected property interest. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 603 (1972).
Under current application of the fourteenth amendment, procedural due process must
precede any "governmental action [which] deprive[s] the individual of a right previously
held under state law . . . ." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708 (1976). "[H]owever, where
government carefully avoided creating any expectation of receipt or renewal upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of stated conditions," it could still claim that the benefit was only a
privilege, since no one had any reasonable expectation of receiving it, and was not subject to
cAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 515 n.4 (1978).
due process considerations. L. TmmE, Am
24. The due process notion of "liberty" has been defined as
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
25. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice
Stevens in a dissenting opinion. Justice White would have set the case for oral argument.
26. Id. at 443-44. The dissenting justices and the lower federal courts, on the other
hand, identified several interests which they believed worthy of protection. See notes 29-31
infra & accompanying text.
27. See note 54 infra & accompanying text.
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sider whether any interests of Flynt and Hustler were sufficient to
invoke procedural due process protection. 28 The Court addressed

only the narrow issue of whether a lawyer had any protected interest in being admitted pro hac vice to represent a client.
H. DuE

PROCESS AND THE LAWYER

The lower federal courts in Leis premised their application of
procedural due process on what they perceived to be a deprivation
of the lawyers' property rights.2 Justice Stevens, in his dissent,
discerned two protected interests. Stevens argued that "the profession's interest in discharging its responsibility for the fair administration of justice in our adversary system" is a liberty interest worthy of due process protection." Moreover, "the 'implicit promise'
inhering in Ohio custom with respect to [pro hac vice] admissions," created a due process property interest.3 1 The majority rejected this rationale by not recognizing any interests sufficient to
invoke procedural due process.
The liberty and property concepts of the due process clause
have been held to encompass*two dimensions of an individual's in28. The Court could not consider the interests of the criminal defendants because of
the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which holds that a federal
court "should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an
adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Id.
at 43-44. Since Flynt and Hustler could assert their alleged sixth amendment right to outof-state counsel in an appeal of any state court conviction, they could not raise that argument in federal court to enjoin the state prosecution. 439 U.S. at 442 n.4.
29. The District Court ruled that "[t]he right of an attorney to represent a client is a
property right" and that this right was "the same whether he seeks initial admission pro hac
vice or where such admission has been granted and subsequently rescinded." 434 F. Supp.
at 486. The right to initial admission, however, sounded more in "liberty," since it was based
on the premise that "any arbitrary exclusion of counsel from representation of a party ..
[could deal] an irreparable blow to his professional standing and his future employment
prospects." Id. at 484. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). The Circuit
Court also concluded that the lawyers' "interests had developed to a point where the court's
action in removing them not only deprived them of their expectation of service and remuneration but also adversely reflected upon their competence and integrity." 574 F.2d at 879.
The court noted that "[tihe Supreme Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits state imposition of an arbitrary standard or the arbitrary application of an inoffensive standard in order to deny employment opportunities to individuals." Id. at 877 n.9.
30. 439 U.S. at 452-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 456. See note 42 infra. Stevens believed that Ohio's "promise" demonstrated
its mutual understanding with "out-of-state practitioners that they are welcome in Ohio
courts unless there is a valid, articulable reason for excluding them." 439 U.S. at 453. See
note 23 supra.
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terest in employment: the constitutional "liberty" to pursue a chosen profession and the proprietary right to hold a specific private
job.2 Pursuit of a legal career is thus a "liberty" protected by due
process. 3 In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,34 for example,
the petitioner, though he had never practiced law in New Mexico,
was held to have an interest in not being excluded "from the practice of law. . . in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 35 The Schware Court did not decide whether the petitioner's interest was an inherent "right," since "[r]egardless of how
the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is
characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid reasons."386 More recently,
however, the Court has described the practice of law as a "right for
one who is qualified by his learning and his moral character."37
The liberty to pursue a profession, however, invokes due process
protection only when governmental action threatens to exclude an
individual entirely from pursuing his chosen profession. 8 Assuming an attorney, like Fahrhiger, possessed an inherent right to
practice law, that right would not extend to appearances pro hac
vice because he would still be free to pursue his legal career in a
state in which he was admitted to the bar. To protect his interest
in representing a particular client, he would have to demonstrate a
property interest in that representation. 9
Because "Ohio has no specific standards regarding pro hac
32. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,
589-90 (1897); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889); Ludtke v. Kuhn, 46 F. Supp.
86, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 (D. Conn. 1977).
33. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Willner v. Committee on Character &
Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
34. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
35. Id. at 238-39.
36. Id. at 239 n.5.
37. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) (emphasis added).
38. A short-order cook, for example, was found to have no protected right to work in a
military munitions plant dining room because she "remained entirely free to obtain employAll that was denied her was the
ment as a short-order cook or to get any other job ....
opportunity to work at one isolated and specific military installation." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961).
39. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).

140

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

vice admission," the Leis court found "no state-law authority"
supporting any claim of entitlement by the lawyers, 40 and thus no

property right in their representation of Flynt. A claim of entitlement must be based on a mutally explicit understanding in order
to invoke due process protection.4 1 Since "the rules of the Ohio
Supreme Court expressly consign the authority to approve a pro
hac vice appearance to the discretion of the trial court," and
though such rules may have prompted "reasonable expectations of
professional service," the Court concluded there was no mutual un-

derstanding that any specific pro hac vice admission would be

permitted.4 2
The issue of entitlement to specific employment normally
arises in cases where government seeks to deprive an individual of
a job he already possesses.48 At least one case, however, indicates

that a mutually explicit understanding 44 of employment may exist
between government and a person who has not begun work at a
particular job. In Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 45 the rules
40. 439 U.S. at 441.
41. See note 23 supra.
'42. 439 U.S. at 443. Justice Stevens, on the other hand, stated that the Ohio rules contained an "implicit assurance" to "out-of-state practitioners that they are welcome in Ohio's
courts unless there is a valid, articulable reason for excluding them." Id. at 453 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens noted several indicators of Ohio custom: (1) the rules of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, which permit "participation by a nonresident of Ohio in a cause
being litigated in this state when such participation is with the leave of the judge hearing
such cause." Omo Sup. CT. R. I; 8(c), (2) Canon 3 of Ohio's Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
[T]he legal profession should discourage regulation that unreasonably imposes
territorial limitations upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his
client or upon the opportunity of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his
choice in all matters including the presentation of a contested matter in a tribunal before which the lawyer is not permanently admitted to practice;
and (3) a leading opinion on pro hac vice admission in Ohio that required a judge to exercise "sound discretion" in deciding a lawyer's pro hac vice application and that identified
criteria to aid in the exercise of that discretion. State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App. 2d 185, 304
N.E.2d 396 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 904 (1974).
43. See cases cited in note 39 supra. See also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333
(1867), in which the Court held:
The attorney and counselor being, by the solemn judicial act of the court,
clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace and favor. . . . It is
a right of which he can only be deprived by the judgment of the court, for moral
or professional delinquency.
Id. at 379.
44. See note 23 supra.
45. 270 U.S. 117 (1925).
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of the Federal Board of Tax Appeals required the enrollment of
attorneys and certified public accountants appearing before the
Board. The rules also provided that "the Board may in its discretion deny admission, suspend or disbar any person."'46 The Goldsmith court concluded that the rule governing admissions "must be
construed to mean discretion ...

exercised after fair investigation,

with such a notice, hearing and opportunity to answer for the applicant as would constitute due process.'

47

Leis may limit Gold-

smith to its facts and compel the conclusion that no attorney may
claim entitlement to admission and therefore, that procedural due
process is not required.
Goldsmith, unlike Leis, involved a federal agency and not a
state court, and thus may constitute little more than an expression
of the Supreme Court's opinion on the procedure that should be
followed in federal proceedings. Such a distinction, however, is
troublesome in light of the subsequent use of Goldsmith as an in-

stance of an appropriate application of due process. 48 Despite the

absence of the term "mutually explicit understanding" in Goldsmith, it is difficult to differentiate Goldsmith from Leis except by
their results. Goldsmith was entitled to a hearing because he fell
within a class over which the Board exercised its discretion. Fahringer, although belonging to a similar class (out-of-state attorneys),
was not accorded a due process hearing. Leis established that
where a state statute provides a state judge with discretion over
pro hac vice applications and offers no standards to guide the exercise of that discretion, the judge is not required to grant a hearing
to such applicants before exercising his discretion, nor is he required to justify his reasons for denial.' 9
Since a lawyer seeking admission pro hac vice in a state with
rules similar to Ohio's cannot claim due process protection before
46. Id. at 123.
47. Id.
48. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), in which the Court interpreted
Goldsmith to mean "that the existence of the Board's eligibility rules gave the petitioner an
interest and claim to practice before the Board to which procedural due process requirements applied." Id. at 576 n.15. See also Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373
U.S. 96, 103, 105 (1963).
49. It has been suggested that, unless the judge's discretion is "unfettered," an entitlement can still exist since the attorneys will expect the judge to exercise his discretion in
accordance with legal rules and reasonableness. See Retaining a Nonresident Attorney,
supra note 11, at 578.
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being granted admission, the question arises whether such protection will attach to prevent arbitrary termination after admission.
Even in the absence of specific pro hac vice rules, a state's "policies and practices" may create a "mutually explicit understanding"
of continued employment of the attorney.50 The smooth operation
of a state judicial system requires that attorneys neither be removed 51 nor permitted to withdraw52 from a trial except for compelling reasons. These policies should be sufficient to create a right
to continued admission of which an attorney cannot be deprived
without procedural due process.5 The Leis majority emphasized
that Fahringer and Cambria had not yet been admitted pro hac
vice," leaving the impression that the result might have been different if they had been. The Court did not determine, however,
when a lawyer's admission pro hac vice is granted and when, therefore, his protected interest crystallizes.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, although admitting that it
could not "define with certainty the status of the lawyers at the
moment they were dismissed," determined that "[t]heir interests
had developed to a point where the court's action in removing
them" should have been preceded by procedural due process.55
The Supreme Court, however, determined that the lawyers had no
"ground for believing they actually had received leave of the court
to appear. ' 56 The facts do not support this conclusion. The provisions of Ohio laws adequately support reliance on the validity of
the pro hac vice status. The attorneys were admitted as counsel of
record by a judge whose specific responsibility was to approve designation of counsel. Under local court rules, this action precluded
50. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972)(teacher could not be dismissed
from state college without due process where there existed de facto tenure system, even in
absence of explicit tenure provisions).
51. See Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
52. See Rule 10(E), Rules of Practice of the Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County,
Ohio, cited in 439 U.S. at 447 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting), which permits a designated attorney to withdraw from a case only "upon written motion and for good cause shown."
53. It should be noted that one pro hac vice admission would not entitle the same
attorney to such admission again. A property interest created by state entitlement is defined
by the terms of the entitlement. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972). Since
pro hoc vice admission is limited to a particular case, the admission ends with the termination of the case.
54. 439 U.S. at 439.
55. Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874, 879 (6th Cir. 1978).
56. 439 U.S. at 440 n.3.
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the attorneys from withdrawing from the defense of Flynt and
57
Hustler "except upon written motion and for good cause shown."
Despite this limitation and the absence of any additional requisites
for pro hac vice admissions-in that court, the Supreme Court
found no indication "that the first judge's endorsement of the entry form, without more, constituted leave for a pro hac vice
appearance."5' 8
The Court's analysis fails to suggest what would have constituted such leave. Was it necessary that the endorsing judge be formally apprised of the lawyers' out-of-state status and that he make
a formal grant of pro hac vice admission, despite the absence of
any such requirement in Ohio law? Or could such admission be
granted only by "the judge hearing such cause," 59 in this case
Judge Morrissey? Since the answer must be found by reference to
state law, it is possible' that the correct answer was given by the
District Court 0 and Court of Appeals 6 1-that the action of the
court in this case was sufficient to constitute admission pro hac
vice.6 2 A drawback of the Supreme Court's approach is that a state
with no rules or whose rules are vague regarding pro hac vice appearances theoretically could allow a judge to terminate an out-ofstate lawyer's representation of a client well past the point when
the lawyer could "reasonably expect" to be terminated, merely by
asserting that it shared no "mutually explicit understanding" with
the lawyer that his representation of a particular client could continue. Because the Supreme Court now concludes that due process
does not protect the right to initial admission pro hac vice, it
should set standards for determining the point at which a pro hac
vice appearance ripens into a constitutionally protected state
entitlement.
57. Rule 10(E), supra note 52.
58. 439 U.S. at 440 n.3. Although there was no procedure for specifically requesting a
pro hoc vice appearance, the plaintiffs suggested in their brief to the Sixth Circuit that the
judge who approved their designation of counsel forms was aware of their out-of-state status: "Fahringer and Cambria ... took great care to insure that [the judge]... was aware
that they were applying for designation as counsel of record and seeking a specific court
order to that effect." Brief for Appellee at 13, Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1978).
59. Omo Sup. CT. R. I, § 8(c).

60. 434 F. Supp. at 483.
61. 574 F.2d at 879.
62. Indeed, the Court has traditionally deferred to the interpretations of state law by
lower federal courts when mor than one interpretation was reasonable. See Bishop v.

Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976).
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Although an attorney cannot demonstrate a sufficient property
interest in pro hac vice admission, this should not preclude his
right to a hearing. If the circumstances surrounding the denial of
his application implicate a liberty interest, e3 he is entitled to due
process protection." Likewise, a court may not deny admission if it
deprives an applicant of equal protection. e5 Because Leis permits
judges to make pro hac vice decisions without divulging their motives, deprivations of liberty and equal protection are more likely
to go undetected and therefore unremedied.

The Court, in considering when due process must precede governmental action resulting in an individual's loss of private employment, has said that
[t]his question cannot be answered by easy assertion that, because [the individual] had no constitutional right to be there in the first place, she was not
deprived of liberty or property by the Superintendent's action. "One may not
have a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the Government may not
prohibit one from going there unless by means consonant with due process of
6
law. e

Hearings on pro hac vice applications are appropriate and
needed means for revealing the character of a judge's reasons for
63. The Court's discussion in Leis dealt almost exclusively with the lawyers' property-as opposed to liberty-interests. Justice Stevens spoke vaguely of "the profession's
interest" in representing unpopular criminal defendants, an interest that would presumably
constitute a "liberty." 439 U.S. at 452-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He recognized the absence of a more traditional liberty claim when he noted that the lawyers "in no way rely on
the fact that the denial of their applications 'might make them somewhat less attractive' to
clients and might otherwise compromise their professional reputations." Id. at n.3, citing
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). It was this type of liberty interest that had been
suggested by the lower federal courts. See note 29 supra.
64. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
65. "Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican
or a Negro or a member of a particular church." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232, 239 (1957). See also Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968); Lefton v.
City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964).
66. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894
(1961), quoting Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The Homer court
held:
In our view lack of a constitutional right to a license or to the positions sought
does not solve the problem. The question should be stated as whether [the petitioners]have been deprived of an employment opportunity in private industry by
governmental action which does not meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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denying admission. In In re Evans,6 7 the trial judge remarked of
the out-of-state attorney during a hearing: "I know he is an able
fellow but he can't behave himself, he don't have any ethics about
him, don't have any respect for counsel or the court or anybody
else and that's what I object to."6 8 Because the hearing failed to
reveal any specific instances of unethical behavior, however, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and admitted the attorney. 9 In hearing the pro hac vice application of former Attorney
General Ramsey Clark in a California criminal case, the judge denied the application, stating only that he "was not disposed to 'appoint' any co-counsel for [the defendant] ... who was not chosen

by the court rather than defendant."70 Again, the lower court's
hearing revealed inadequate grounds for its decision, and was reversed on appeal. 71 On the other hand, hearings have also provided
trial judges with valid reasons for exclusion that can be readily understood by reviewing courts.72 If a hearing revealed that a judge
had denied an application because he disliked the attorney's politics or the type of defendant he usually represented, this would
probably be sufficient
to constitute a deprivation of the applicant's
73
liberty interests.

Justice Stevens expressed his concern with the possibility that
a trial judge would base his decision on personal prejudices:
The record does suggest, and in any case the Court's broad holding
would certainly encompass, one explanation for Judge Morrissey's unusual
ruling, but it can hardly be characterized as legitimate. This is an obscenity
67. 524 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).
68. Id. at 1006.
69. Id. at 1008. The Circuit Court explicitly stated that "[i]f a District Court has evidence of behavior that it believes justifies denying an attorney admission pro hac vice, it
must set a hearing date and give the attorney notice of all incidents of alleged misbehavior
or unethical behavior that will be charged against him." Id.
70. Magee v. Superior Ct., 8 Cal. 3d 949, 952, 506 P.2d 1023, 1025, 106 Cal. Rptr. 647,
649 (1973)(emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 954, 506 P.2d at 1026, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 650. See also Munoz v. United States
Dist. Ct., 446 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1971).
72. See, e.g., In re Belli, 371 F. Supp. 111 (D.D.C. 1974) (denial of application permissible where attorney admitted, at hearing, making untrue derogatory remarks on national
television about judge and court before which he sought admission); State v. Ross, 36 Ohio
App. 2d 185, 304 N.E.2d 396 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 904 (1974)(denial of application
permissible where attorney, at hearing, refused to cease "unprofessional conduct" outside
courtroom).
73. See, e.g., Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968); Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964).
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case. Conceivably Judge Morrissey has strong views about the distribution of
pornographic materials to minors and about lawyers who specialize in defending such activity. Perhaps these are not the kind of lawyers that he wants
practicing in his courtroom. That Judge Morrissey reportedly referred to
Fahringer as a "fellow traveler" of pornographers is at least consistent with
these speculations. 4

As Justice Stevens noted, one can only speculate on Judge Morrissey's motivation. But that is the point. If there had been "a meaningful hearing, the application of a reasonably clear legal standard
and the statement of a rational basis for exclusion," 5 Judge Morrissey's true motivation would have been made more clear. 76
Although hearings are likely to bring into focus the reasons
behind a government official's denial of a particular privilege, the
Court has previously refused.to require them. The Supreme Court
rejected, for example, the suggestion of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals that "a hearing and a statement of reasons were required. .. 'as a prophylactic against non-retention decisions improperly motivated by exercise of protected rights.' "7 Likewise, in
an earlier case, the Court held due process did not require a hearing before terminating an employee's right to enter a military installation.7 That decision prompted Justice Brennan to write in
dissent:
[I]f~petitioner Brawner's badge had been lifted avowedly on grounds of her
race, religion, or political opinions, the Court would concede that some constitutionally protected interest.., had been injured. But, as the Court says,
there has been no such open discrimination here .... [The Court] holds

that the mere assertion by government that exclusion is for a valid reason
forecloses further inquiry. That is, unless the government official is foolish
enough to admit what he is doing . . . he may employ "security require-

ments" [or other valid reasons] as 7a blind behind which to dismiss at will for
the most discriminatory of causes.

9

74. 439 U.S. at 447 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d at 877.
76. Absent a statutory standard for pro hoc vice admissions that is discriminatory on
its face, or a long course of conduct evincing discriminatory application of a valid standard,
a judge's true motives might remain successfully concealed if no hearing is required before
denial of the application.
77. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 n.14 (1972)(emphasis supplied by Supreme
Court), quoting the Circuit Court opinion, 446 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1971).
78. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896
(1961).
79. Id. at 900 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Given the reluctance of the Court to require a due process
hearing to insure that a government official's motivations are legitimate, it is unlikely that its decision will be different where a lawyer's interest in practicing pro hac vice is concerned. Leis essentially recognized this fact. A decision requiring a due process
hearing, however, would go far to alleviate the danger of sporadic
injustice, both for lawyers and the clients they represent.8 0
CONCLUSION

Justice Stevens considered it "ironic that this litigation should
end as it began-with a judicial ruling on the merits before the
' The few pro hac vice
parties have been heard on the merits."81
cases that have reached the Supreme Court have received similar
cursory treatment.8 2 A more thorough consideration of the matter
by the Court might resolve some of the problems left by Leis.
Leis, however, did not leave pro hac vice representation totally unprotected by the due process clause. Should a state enact
explicit standards for pro hac vice admission, those standards
could create a "mutually explicit understanding" between attorneys and the state that any lawyer meeting them would be admitted. Procedural due process would then require hearings before admission could be denied.83 Unfortunately, the possibility that clear
pro hac vice standards would impose due process hearing requirements where none would otherwise exist, might encourage states to
retain vague, broadly discretionary rules. The trend today should
be toward more explicit standards so lawyers and clients can know
with reasonable certainty whether their professional relationships
will remain effective across state boundaries. 8 ' Explicit standards
80. See note 76 supra.
81. 439 U.S. at 457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens thought the issue of
whether to require a hearing in the trial court was important enough to warrant oral argu-

ment before the Supreme Court.
82.

Leis is the most detailed consideration ever given the issue by the Supreme Court.

In recent years the Court has twice affirmed without opinion federal district courts rulings,
upholding state rules that commit pro hac vice decisions to the judges before whom the outof-state attorneys wish to appear. Silverman v. Browning, 429 U.S. 876 (1976), summarily
aff'g 414 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn.); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Beatty, 423 U.S. 1009 (1975),
summarily aff'g 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.). A pro hac vice controversy has never been set

for oral argument before the Court.
83.
84.

See note 23 supra.
The policy of the American Bar Association is to discourage unreasonable territorial
limitations on an attorney's representation of his clients. ABA CODE OF PRoFrssioNAL RE-
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would also reduce the likelihood that pro hac vice requests will be
treated in an arbitrary manner.
Even in states where there is no entitlement to initial pro hac
vice admission, attorneys should be entitled to continue their representation once admission has been granted.85 The Court's failure
to delineate the point at which a state's treatment of an out-ofstate attorney, becomes a mutual understanding of continued service creates additional confusion over when a lawyer may claim
due process protection.
There is no indication that states are closing their courtroom
doors more frequently to out-of-state lawyers since Leis v. Flynt
was decided. Nor is there any evidence that states with relatively
explicit pro hac vice rules vill make them any less clear. Even
without the compulsion of due process, it is possible that states
with informal procedures will eventually clarify them. The Supreme Court, however, has missed an excellent opportunity to provide guidance for states in that endeavor.
TIMOTHY C. CASHMORE

No. 3. See note 42 supra. The need to know the status of an attorneyclient relationship in a state where the lawyer is not admitted is particulary acute where the
lawyer is a specialist, whose expertise is sought by clients in several states, or where the
client is involved in legal action spanning many jurisdictions. See Brakel, supra note 4, at
1084; Easing Restrictions,supra note 11, at 1186-91.
85. See notes 50-53 supra & accompanying text.
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